














How Does the Theologizing of Physics Contribute to Global Warming?







In 1833, William Whewell—the great historian and philosopher of science—published the Third Bridgewater Treatise, the purpose of which was to, “show how the views of the creation, preservation, and government of the universe, which natural science opens up to us, harmonize with our belief in a Creator, Governor, and Preserver of the world” (Whewell, 1862, p. 2).  Whewell’s goal was nothing new.  Ever since the early days of the Scientific Revolution, scientists and philosophers had been struggling to reconcile their emerging views of the proper ways to study and describe the natural world with their religious commitments.  In many, if not most, cases science—or the systematic study of the Book of Nature—was conceived of as supporting religious belief (see Shapin, 1996, pp. 135-65).  Whewell’s attempt to mobilize the products of science in support of his religious convictions was not novel either in its objectives or in its basic strategy; however, it was refreshingly candid about the role of a certain metaphor in affecting this reconciliation of science and religion.  Whewell was careful to point out that his particular version of the argument from design rested upon the idea that Nature was governed by a system of laws and though these laws were different, in some respects, from those laws which govern civil societies, it was still appropriate to infer from the “the simplicity, the comprehensiveness, the mutual adaptation of these laws” (Whewell, 1862, p. 2) both the existence and certain perfections of the Legislator.  It was important to Whewell that the decrees of the Author of the laws of nature were recognized to have a systematic, hierarchical structure.  This structure was supposed to be recognizable in those disciplines that had “acquired any considerable degree of completeness” (Whewell, 1862, p. 316).  As these disciplines—which in Whewell’s enumeration included astronomy, mechanics and optics—developed, more and more of this hierarchical structure was revealed and so science offered more and more evidence for the knowledge and intelligence of the Author of these laws. Furthermore, the recognition that these successful areas of physics were governed by such a system of laws led to the expectation that other areas of science, as they developed, would likewise be subsumed within this system. Charles Babbage, writing in the so-called Ninth Bridgewater treatise, gave eloquent expression to this thought when he claimed: 

In the earlier stages of our knowledge we behold a multitude of distinct laws … as science advances, many of these minor laws are found to merge into some more general principles; and with its higher progress these secondary principles appear, in their turn, the mere consequences of some still more general law…All analogy leads us to infer, and new discoveries continually direct our expectation to the idea, that the most extensive laws to which we have hitherto attained, converge to some few simple and general principles, by which the whole of the material universe is sustained, and from which infinitely varied phenomena emerge as necessary consequences.

							(Babbage, 1837 p. 31-2)

Whewell shared Babbage’s conception of the regulative ideal towards which science should progress. As a result, he thought that those scientists who wished to advance our understanding of the world—as opposed to those engaged in the merely “deductive” business of uncovering its “proximate” principles—should labor under the assumption that:

[A]ll facts and appearances,  all partial laws, however confused and casual they at  present seem, must still, in reality, have this same kind  of bearing and dependence; — must be bound together  by some undiscovered principle of order; — must proceed  from some cause working by most steady rules; —  must be included in some wide and fruitful general  truth. He cannot therefore consider any principles  which he has already obtained, as the ultimate and  sufficient reason of that which he sees. There must  be some higher principal, some ulterior reason.
					
							(Whewell, 1862, p. 284)

Whewell (and Babbage) think of the product of successful science in a particular way—as revealing a part of God’s neat, well-organized, and unified plan for the universe—and they support this thought by invoking the fundamental physics of their time.  Furthermore, this way of thinking about successful science—based on a theology-infused interpretation of parts of physics—translates into norms for how scientists should proceed and for what constitutes a well-developed discipline.

While many of those who think about the appropriate ways to study and describe the natural world today would be reticent about the argument from design, it is not uncommon to maintain an image of science that is drawn from the theologized conception of physics so prominent in Whewell.  That is, many are still drawn to the idea that successful science results in theories unified under “simple and general” laws from which the more mundane “proximate principles” flow by ‘deduction’.  This image lends itself, in turn, to two related positions that are both prominent in and disastrous to much contemporary thinking about science: fundamentalism and the supervenience of descriptive adequacy.  By fundamentalism I mean—following Nancy Cartwright—the idea that the laws found to govern “behavior in highly structured, manufactured environments” (Cartwright, 1996, p. 316) like those investigated by fundamental physics, should be supposed to be the principles from which the “proximate principles” investigated in complex and/or applied situations flow.  If one is tempted by this sort of fundamentalism, it is also natural to assume that the adequacy of descriptions of complex, applied, or real world phenomenon depend upon accurate descriptions of the more fundamental processes from which they arise, which is what I mean by the supervenience of descriptive adequacy.  Though each, and perhaps both, of these principles may be plausible when thinking about some applied or complex branch of science, I contend that neither is a plausible general principle.  Furthermore in many fields with established track record of success—measured by successful application and dependable prediction—there is no reason to suppose them to be true.  This means that it is not appropriate to assume either of these principles when evaluating the predictive and descriptive potential of Global Climate Modeling.   I contend, however, that much of the skepticism about the predictive and attributive potential of global climate models can be traced to these assumptions, which have their origins in a theologized conception of physics like that articulated in the Bridgewater Treatises.

Skepticism about Climate Change

Attempts to implement policies designed to mitigate or minimize climate change have often been met (particularly in the United States) with skepticism.  This skepticism has frequently (and successfully) been used to undermine the urgency, and even the advisability, of enacting such policies. Skepticism about climate science, and human induced climate change in particular, takes a variety of forms.  Some deny that the global climate is warming at all, often by trying to undermine the legitimacy of the data or methods used to reconstruct the changes in average global temperature over the last 150 years.  It seems to me that this sort of skepticism is waning in the face of the rapidly diminishing arctic ice cap and record global temperatures; furthermore, Norton and Suppe (Norton and Suppe, 2001) have presented a detailed and convincing defense of the methods used by climate scientist to measure and reconstruct the global average temperature record.   I will not address this form of skepticism in this paper. Another prominent type of skeptic accepts both that the climate is warming and that humans are a principle cause of this warming, but they contest the strategy of restricting greenhouse gas emissions, often by presenting cost/benefit analyses which presumably show that some alternative strategies have higher expected utility (see for example, Lomborg, 2001).  This sort of skepticism is, alas, waxing, at least in part because of the value dependence of assessments of the utility of possible outcomes, which allows for a wide variety of different conclusions about optimum strategies.  While this sort of skepticism is important, and may be the source of some interesting questions for those who think about public policy or practical reasoning, I am not going to address this form of skepticism either.  Instead I will address intermediate versions of skepticism about climate change that are directed at either the detection and attribution of climate change​[1]​ or the predictions of future climate based on a variety of different possible greenhouse gas emission scenarios.  

These intermediate versions of skepticism about climate change have a common core in that they rest on doubts about the legitimacy of using global climate models to predict how the earth’s climate system would (or will) respond to a range of different atmospheric conditions (or forcing scenarios).  In order to detect a climate change in some measured data, it must be shown that the measured data would have been unlikely to occur due to natural variation in a base climate system (the pre-industrial climate, say). Global climate models, run multiple times to assess the distribution of possible outcomes, are one important tool for gauging the range of natural variation and so for establishing when the climate has changed.  Attributions of climate change—deciding, say, what caused the detected increase in global average temperature in the 20th century—are also dependent on the use of global climate models.  Attribution typically proceeds by comparing the outputs of climate models run both with and without the presence of anthropogenic forcing (greenhouse gas emissions, aerosols, etc.) to some set of measured climate variables.  For example, the IPCC supports it attribution of 20th century global warming to anthropogenic sources as follows: 

When the effects of increasing levels of greenhouse gases are included in the models, as well as natural external factors, the models produce good simulations of the warming that has occurred over the past century. The models fail to reproduce the observed warming when run using only natural factors.
						(Hegerl, et. al. 2007, p. 702)

Lastly, predictions of the future climate depend on the outputs of global climate models that are run under the assumption that the concentrations of greenhouse gases and other atmospheric constituents correspond to a particular emission scenario.  Multiple such models are run, and the results are averaged to produce a multi-model mean for each of a range of possible emissions scenarios.  Clearly, then, global climate models play a central role in the capacity for climate science to address the sorts of questions—such as what causes global warming and what will happen if greenhouse gas emissions continue unabated—that are relevant to climate policy.  Given their central role, it is no surprise that the legitimacy of using global climate models for predictions of the sort described above has come under attack by those bent upon subverting any policies meant to address climate change.  What is surprising, however, is that such skeptics have been able to appeal to the writings of many of those philosophers and some of the scientists who have thought about the epistemology of global climate modeling for support.

The frequency with which writers express skepticism about the predictive adequacy of global climate models—and thus the detections, attributions, and projections of future climate that are based on these models—is a striking feature of what little work has been done on the epistemology of global climate modeling​[2]​.  Even scholars, such as Stephen Haller (Haller, 2002) and Naomi Oreskes (Oreskes et. al., 1994, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2007), who support policies designed to mitigate climate change and who accept the basic conclusions of climate science (the world is warming due to human influence and will likely continue to do so) have made a point of arguing that they accept these positions in spite of the predictive inadequacies of climate models.  Haller maintains that because of their epistemological shortcomings, global climate models can be used to reveal “possibilities and not probabilities” (Haller, 2002, p. 76).  Oreskes, similarly, has claimed:

If model results were the only basis for the current scientific understanding, they would be grounds for some healthy skepticism.  Models are therefore best viewed as heuristic devices: a means to explore what if scenarios.
							(Oreskes, 2007, p. 86)





Arguments against the Predictive Adequacy of Global Climate Models

Like most scientific models or theories that are at the center of an active and growing research field worked in by thousands of scientists all over the world, global climate models have been criticized, adjusted, evaluated and refined throughout their 40 year history.  While acknowledging both weaknesses in the evaluation of these models and areas in which they still need to be improved, the IPCC has asserted in its most recent report that, “[t]here is considerable confidence that Atmospheric-Ocean General Circulation Models [the most detailed global climate models] provide credible quantitative estimates of future climate change” (Randall et. al., p. 591).  Presumably, according to the skeptics described above, these scientists have overlooked some basic epistemological principles that determine whether or not a model is capable of supporting (quantitative) predictions: if only the climate scientists had bothered to reflect upon the conditions for successful prediction, they might have saved policy makers and “the crowd of deluded citizens” from the false security of confident detection, attribution, and prediction of climate change.  Alternatively, when confronted with the considered opinion of thousands of people who have devoted their lives to modeling the global climate, one might wonder if the epistemological principles so flippantly invoked by these climate model skeptics are quite as obvious and correct as they are supposed to be.  Indeed, it seems only rational to me, given the dubious history of failed attempts to articulate the epistemological norms of ‘good’ science, to first carefully consider whether the epistemological principles invoked by these modeling skeptics are plausible guidelines for assessing the predictive potential of a model.  It may turn out—as I will indeed argue in this paper—that these epistemological criticisms of global climate modeling say more about the image of science with which the skeptics are working than they say about the trustworthiness of the quantitative predictions of global climate models.
 
It would be tedious, and impractical in a paper such as this, to try to individually analyze all of the different epistemological arguments meant to undermine the predictive adequacy of global climate models, so instead I will try to isolate three recurring types of argument that, I think, capture most of the considerations invoked by this sort of skeptic. My hope is that even if some particular skeptical arguments don’t fit comfortably within one of these argument types, the way of responding to them that I develop in the later part of this paper will be readily adaptable to these outlying epistemological arguments.  Additionally, I want to be clear that global climate models are constantly being criticized and challenged within the climate science community.  This sort of ‘internal’ criticism is a natural part of scientific development and should be distinguished from the ‘external’ epistemological criticism put forward by climate modeling skeptics and addressed in this paper.  ‘Internal’ criticism is typically particular and constructive—aiming to improve the predictive performance of global climate models—whereas ‘external’ criticism invokes general epistemological principles foreign to the practice itself and typically argues (or insinuates) that the whole enterprise of employing global climate models for predictions is misguided​[4]​.
Uncertainty about Smaller Scale Processes

The most common epistemological critique of global climate modeling is grounded in uncertainty about the characterizations of the smaller scale processes used to model the global climate.  This sort of critique typically develops by pointing out two features of climate modeling.  First is the use of parameters to represent sub grid scale atmospheric processes, and second is the lack of any guarantee that the set of causal factors included in a global climate model is complete.  Global climate models divide up the oceans and atmosphere into a three dimensional grid and keep track of the values of climate variables (pressure, temperature, etc.) for each of the boxes generated by this grid.  As modeling techniques and computer power have developed, these grid boxes have gotten smaller, but the values of the variables assigned to these boxes still represent an average over the region of the atmosphere (or ocean) in the box.  Some processes that are relevant to the large scale properties of the atmosphere (such at the development of clouds) take place at a spatial scale that is not resolved by these grid boxes and so their effects must be taken in account by averaging them out over the boxes (so the models keep track of the average effects of clouds in the grid box, but not of individual clouds).  This technique is known as ‘parameterization’ (Randall et. all, 2007, p. 596).  At the same time that the spatial resolution of global climate models has increased, so too has the number of components and processes that are included in the models.  Whereas early global climate models kept track only of the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and solar radiation, contemporary models include representations of the circulating oceans, atmospheric chemistry, and the interactions between the atmosphere and the biosphere, etc.  Of course it is always possible that something important has been left out and climate modelers devote a considerable amount of effort to deciding what sorts of processes must be included in order to accurately represent the variety of climate variables that they are interested in.  But the fact that there is no guarantee of the completeness of the set of processes or factors considered when using global climate models to make predictions is often cited as a reason not to trust the quantitative predictions of such models.  I now want to consider why these features of global climate models are taken to establish that such models are unreliable for predictions.

Dyson explains why the parameterization in global climate models undermines their predictive adequacy as follows: “[T]he climate models on which so much effort has been expended are unreliable because they still use fudge-factors rather than physics to represent important things like evaporation and convection, clouds and rainfall” (Dyson, 1999, p. 12).  Of course, calling parameters “fudge-factors” does not make them sound like a legitimate part of a potentially predictive model, but Dyson provides no reason to suppose that, in general, physics does better than fudge in the generation of reliable predictions of global scale variables (such as mean surface temperature).  Oreskes does not do much better.  She introduces a distinction between “open” and “closed” systems and then claims that “the value of model predictions is undermined by their uncertainty, which arises primarily from the fact that our models of complex natural systems are always open” (Oreskes, 2003, p. 13).  One reason that Oreskes provides for thinking that models of complex systems are “open” is that “models require input parameters that are incompletely known” (Oreskes, 1994, p. 641).  Not surprisingly, further evidence for the openness, and thus the lack of predictive adequacy, of models of complex systems comes from the fact that, “[w]hen we create a model. We abstract from the natural world certain elements that we believe to be salient to the problem that we wish to understand, and we omit everything else” (Oreskes, 2003, p. 17).  Evidently, it is the inability to fully specify the system being modeled, as evidenced in the dependence on parameters (which, presumably cannot be know with certainty) and the possibility that some important factor has been omitted, that convinces Oreskes that the predictions of models of complex systems cannot be trusted. Again, however, there is no real argument for the claim that it is impossible to make accurate predictions about global properties because climate models are uncertain in these ways.  If this is an epistemological truth, it is not an obvious one.  

Some help in articulating the reasons behind the inference from the uncertainty in the representation of smaller scale processes to the predictive inadequacy of global climate models is available by considering Haller’s more explicit formulation of this sort of argument. Haller articulates two requirements for successful prediction and then argues that global climate models satisfy neither of these requirements.  The second requirement, which is the one most relevant to kind of argument being considered here, is that “it is necessary to have a reliable description of the mechanisms that translate a set of initial data into a prediction” (Haller, 2002, p. 47).  Having a “reliable description of the mechanism” apparently involves knowing “whether the category divisions in a particular model represent important categories of mechanism in the actual world” (Haller, 2002, p. 51).  This appears to be a worry about both the completeness of the set of factors or processes that go into global climate models and the ways that these factors or processes are put together to generate global predictions.  The assumption seems to be that it is not reasonable to trust the predictions of a model of a complex system, like a global climate model, unless you know that you have the mechanisms, at some more fundamental level of description, correct.  The fact that a model relies upon uncertain parameters to represent smaller scale processes would, under an assumption like this, look like a confession that the ‘mechanisms’ underwriting the model’s predictions were not known.  Similarly, the possibility that factors or processes which influence climate had not been included in the model might also be taken as evidence that confidence in the ‘mechanisms’ underlying the model, and thus predictions based on it, would be misplaced.  It seems plausible, then, to identify the epistemological principle behind this kind of argument against the predictive adequacy of global climate models as being a version of what I had earlier called the supervenience of descriptive adequacy.  That is, these arguments depend upon the assumption that the descriptive (and thus predictive) adequacy of global climate models depends upon having complete and/or accurate descriptions of the more fundamental processes that influence the global climate.  In an evident case of fundamentalism in the sense described earlier, Dyson characterizes this more fundamental level of description as “physics”, while Haller is a bit more cautious insisting only that the “mechanism” is correct.

Model Evaluation and Predictive Adequacy

The second broad class of argument against the predictive adequacy of global climate models is based on concerns about how global climate models are evaluated.  “Evaluation” is the term used by the IPCC for the process of assessing “the capacity of global climate models…for projecting future climate change” (Randall et. al., 2007, p. 591) and so it includes what epistemologist might call the ‘testing’ of the model by confronting it with empirical evidence.  An entire chapter of the latest IPCC report is devoted to both explaining how climate modelers evaluate their models and providing a detailed assessment of which aspects of the climate can be confidently predicted (Randall et. al., 2007).  Modeling skeptics typically point out two features of global climate models that are taken to show that all of this evaluation is in vain.  First is the impossibility of ‘directly testing’ the predictions of global climate models and second is the dependence of global climate models on the ‘tuning’ of their parameters. The direct testing of the predictions of a global climate model would presumably involve traveling into the future and measuring the predicted climate variables and then comparing these with the outputs of the model.  Though everyone would agree that this is impossible, its significance for the possibility of reliable predictions of the climate is not evident. In addition, as described previously, the actual numerical values of the parameters in a global climate model are often not known (though some of them may be measurable, or known to be within a certain range).  To supply the numerical values required as input for the models, it is common to “adjust parameter values (possibly chosen from some prior distribution) in order to optimize the model simulations of particular variables or to improve global heat balance” (Randall et. al., 2007, p. 596).  The tuning of global climate models to give a best fit to some data is, like the impossibility of direct testing, invoked by modeling skeptics to support the conclusion that global climate models are not now, and perhaps never will be, reliable instruments for prediction.  Again, it will be worth looking in more detail at these arguments in order to uncover the epistemological assumptions behind this predictive pessimism.

There is a common structure that can be teased out of the skeptical arguments intended to show that the kinds of evaluation done by global climate modelers are incapable (at least for now) of establishing the predictive reliability of their models. These arguments begin by distinguishing between two circumstances in which we might legitimately have confidence in the predictive adequacy of a model: the model may have been either directly assessed for predictive reliability, or it may first have been established that the model provides good explanations, or a realistic representation of its target system, and then inferred that the predictions must be reliable. In order to directly assess the predictive reliability of a model, it is then alleged, certain special kinds of circumstances must obtain.  These circumstances include, in particular, the possibility of ‘directly testing’ the model.  Since—it is supposed— direct testing is not possible for global climate models (and perhaps for some additional reasons as well), this cannot be how the predictive adequacy of global climate models is established. The other way that the predictive reliability of global climate models might be established is by inferring it from the fact that the model provides good explanations of known climate data—and so provides a realistic representation of the global climate.  But this indirect strategy, the argument goes, runs into two problems.  First, the “tuning” of global climate models shows that these models cannot confidently be known to be part of, or constitute, good explanations of climate data.  And second, even if global climate models did provide good explanations of climate data, it is not safe to infer predictive adequacy from explanatory success.

Versions of this argument can be found in both Oreskes and Haller​[5]​.  These arguments differ somewhat in their details, but there is general agreement about the special circumstances in which it is possible to have direct predictive confidence in a mode of a complex system. Oreskes thinks that, “successful prediction in science is less common than most of us think” and that “it has generally been limited to short duration, repetitive systems, characterized by small numbers of measurable variables” (Oreskes, 2003, p. 15).  Even in these cases, though, successful prediction was “achieved only after adjustments to the model in response to earlier failed predictions” (Oreskes, 2003, p. 24).  Similarly, Haller asserts that, “the best thing to do with a new, rough model of some natural system is to test it against its predictions and then to correct it by a method of trial and error until it generates precise and reliable predictions” (Haller, p. 32).   Further, these authors agree that global climate models cannot be subjected to the trial and error adjustments that are, apparently, crucial to successful prediction. It is tempting to summarize this line as the claim that global climate models are not subject to the sort of ‘tuning’ that is characteristic of those situations where models or theories of complex systems have been able to generate reliable predictions. 

Given that the direct establishment of predictive confidence in global climate models is impossible, the only other route to predictive confidence in global climate models would be an indirect one.  As Haller puts it, “we cannot wait for researchers to perfect…models by revising them in light of the successful and unsuccessful predictions that they generate…We must, then, accept or reject these models…only according to their ability to give intellectually satisfying explanations of currently observable phenomena” (Haller, 2002, p. 32).  But according to Haller, a model provides a good explanation be of a phenomenon only if that phenomena would be improbable if the model were not reliable.  Since global climate models are ‘tuned’ to match observed phenomena, it is not at all improbable that the phenomena would obtain according to the model. This means that the fact that a model has reproduced known climate data does not support the conclusion that the “model was an accurate representation of events” (Haller, 2002, p. 38) or that the model provides a good explanation of the climate data.  If we do not have a good reason to suppose that our climate models are good explanations (= accurate representations), then, Haller concludes, we shouldn’t trust their (quantitative) predictions either.  Oreskes offers a similar argument against what I have called indirect ways of establishing the predictive adequacy of a model, but she formulates this argument as a general ‘paradox’ that must be confronted by those who hope to model complex systems.  Modeling a complex system, Oreskes plausibly contends, requires making simplifying assumptions that typically employ parameters to account for unresolved, more fundamental processes.  Each added parameter, however, makes it more difficult to assess the representational accuracy of the model, presumably because that parameter introduces a degree of freedom that might just be ‘tuned’ to capture that available data.  As a result, “it may never be possible to say that a given model configuration is correct and, therefore, that its predictions will come true” (Oreskes, 2003, p. 20). The worry here seems to be about capturing the underlying causal processes responsible for the available data, for Oreskes claims in an earlier paper that, “the capacity to mimic data is not evidence that you have captured the underlying causal processes, and therefore not evidence of predictive capacity.”  So in both of these authors we can see that they believe that the indirect route to successful prediction, by way of good explanation or accurate representation, is also closed to global climate models in virtue of the process of tuning their parameters.  

Additionally, both of these authors remark on fact the explanation and prediction of a phenomenon, or system, do not necessarily go together.  As a result, even should it be established that a model supported good explanations, it would not follow that it gives good predictions. Indeed, Haller remarks on the “trade-off” between explanation and prediction (Haller, 2002, p. 29), while Oreskes describes the ironic situation where the representational accuracy of a model increases while, “the certainty of its predictions may decrease” (Oreskes, 2003, p. 20).  In spite of this recognition of the complex relationship between the explanatory and predictive usefulness, or adequacy, of models, both of these authors are confident that the dependence of global climate models on tuned parameters shows that they should not be taken to be accurate representations of the global climate, and are therefore cannot be supposed to reliable for predictions.  It is tempting to summarize this line of argument as the claim that because global climate models are subject to ‘tuning’ (which, recall, is characteristic of successful predictions of complex systems), they cannot be taken to be good explanations … and so cannot be counted on for predictions either.  What creates the seemingly contradictory attitude towards ‘tuning’ evident in Haller and Oreskes is the forced choice between mere prediction by trial and error and truly representative explanation. There seems to be no recognition of the possibility of modeling a complex system by resolving it into a set of ‘higher level’ factors or processes, which are collectively and individually ‘tuned’ to capture their quantitative interrelations. Such models may well provide explanations, which admittedly do not reach ‘all the way down’ to fundamental physics, and yet still be tuned to give good predictions—at least, this is what global climate modelers hope they have done.  For Oreskes and Haller, the fact that a theory or model employs tuned parameters leads to the presumption that it cannot be regarded as representationally adequate.   Representational adequacy is incompatible with tuning because, presumably, the dependence on tuning shows that the system being modeled is not fundamentally understood (or adequately explained).  If the system cannot be accurately characterized at the fundamental level, then—by what is evidently another version of the supervenience of descriptive adequacy—this implies that it should not be regarded as providing a reliable description of the real world system it was intended to model, and thus would not support an indirect argument for predictive reliability.

Conflicts between Models and Known Features of Climate 

The last broad class of reasons provided for distrusting the predictions of global climate models depends on pointing out conflicts between some known climate data and either the inputs to, or outputs from, the global climate models. Typically, the existence of these conflicts is taken to show that the factors or mechanisms responsible for the climate are “neither sufficiently known nor understood,” and thus that none of the predictions generated by the global climate models should be taken to be quantitatively reliable.  On the input side, many modeling skeptics cite the use of ‘flux adjustments’ as evidence that global climate models must be misrepresenting the climate and so cannot be relied upon for prediction.  In the early versions of coupled atmosphere- ocean general circulation models, it was common to “adjust the surface heat, water and momentum fluxes artificially to maintain a stable control climate” (Randall et. al., 2007, p. 607).  Without such adjustments it was not, at that early stage, possible to get the coupled models to equilibrate to a stable climate that reproduced important qualitative features of the actual atmospheric/ocean system (such as the thermohaline circulation of the oceans).  In order to get these models to behave, “modelers would … force transfers of water and so forth, formally violating the laws of physics to compensate for their models deficiencies” (quoted from Weart, 2007).  For the most part, current coupled ocean-atmosphere general circulation models no longer employ flux adjustments (see Randall et. al., 2007 for a list of models indicating which of them still employ flux adjustments); however, it is quite possible that some values of parameters used in the current models are incompatible with the best physical understandings of the processes that they represent​[6]​.  On the output side, the latest IPCC report is quite candid about the fact that “models still show significant errors” (Randall et. al., 2007, p. 601).  Though regional climate modeling has improved, it is still the case that smaller scale climate predictions, such as how the average temperature or precipitation in the Sahel will evolve under a particular climate scenario, are in many cases not yet judged to be reliable (Christensen et. al., 2007, p. 866).  Likewise certain large scale features of the atmosphere-ocean system, such as the El Niño-Southern Oscillation, are not consistently reproduced in global climate models.  These failures are also sometimes used to argue that global climate models are not accurate representations of the system that they hope to model and therefore that they cannot be relied upon for quantitative prediction.

Arguments against the predictive adequacy of global climate models based on the use of flux adjustments are presented by most of the skeptics considered in this paper, though they are often mixed up with more general worries about the use of parameters in global climate models. The difference between these two concerns, as I have presented them, is that flux adjustments involve the choice of parameter values that are in explicit conflict with known facts about the atmosphere.  The more general worry about parameterization, on the other hand, was that there were unknowns that introduced uncertainty into global climate models.  In some sense, then, flux adjustments are a more direct challenge to the realism of global climate models than is their general dependence on parameterization.  Flux adjustments—or other features of the climate models that are in explicit conflict with known feature of the atmospheres—are deliberate deviations from the most realistic characterizations of some of the factors or processes that contribute to the global climate model which are introduced to insure that the large scale climatically important features of the model are more realistic​[7]​.  That is, they are evidence that micro-realism had been sacrificed in order to obtain macro-realism.  While most global climate modelers aim to be as ‘realistic’ as possible at all levels, it may not be possible to maximize the representational accuracy of a model at all levels simultaneously.  If one insists upon the supervenience of descriptive adequacy, then it is clear why flux adjustments, or other direct conflicts, might be taken to undermine the predictive adequacy of a global climate model.  They are evidence that the model is misrepresenting the more fundamental processes responsible for climate, and so could not provide accurate descriptions of this large scale, real world system.

Arguments against the predictive adequacy of global climate models that start with conflicts between the output from these models and some measured climate data are often known as ‘cherry-picking’ arguments.  Cherry-picking arguments work by identifying some feature of the global climate that is not well represented by the models, and then inferring that the models must be unreliable, generally, in virtue of this representational failure.  A clear example of this occurs in (Dyson, 1999) where he claims: 

[T]he latest and biggest climate models have … defects that make them unreliable.  With one exception, they do not predict the existence of El Niño.  Since El Niño is a major feature of the observed climate, any model that fails to predict it is clearly deficient.

Because of this deficiency, Dyson recommends to politicians and the public that they, “don’t believe the numbers” produced by global climate models. This same sort of argument is prevalent in (Soon et. al., 1999, 2001) where they progress through a list of predictive inadequacies of then current climate models and then conclude with the very general claim that, “global environmental change resulting from increased atmospheric CO2 is not quantifiable” (Soon et. al, 2001, p. 272).  Because the IPCC reports are upfront with the representational deficiencies of global climate models yet they still profess confidence that these models give good predictions of at least some climate variables, it is clear that the broader community of climate modelers do not assume that all aspects of the climate must be well represented by a climate model in order for that model to support adequate predictions of some climate variables.  The idea that a model must get everything right in order to get anything right goes right along with the assumption of the supervenience of descriptive adequacy.  For misrepresenting some aspect of the climate is as evidence that a model gets at least some of the fundamental processes responsible for climate wrong (and is taken as such by the climate modeling community), and if this is so, it would follow from the supervenience of descriptive adequacy that climate generally could not be well described by such a model.
How to think about the Epistemology of Global Climate Modeling

I hope to have shown that, at least in the case of the three kinds of arguments considered in this paper, general epistemological skepticism about the predictive adequacy of global climate models has its roots in a particular image of successful science.  This image of successful science shows up in these skeptical arguments as a related collection of assumptions about the proper relationship between descriptions of complex real world phenomena and descriptions of the more fundamental process from which they supposedly derive.  More specifically, we have seen again and again how these skeptics infer from the fact that the descriptions of these more fundamental processes are incomplete or inaccurate that the descriptions and predictions of the larger scale, real world phenomena, which are the principle targets of global climate modeling, should not be regarded as accurate either.  I have suggested that this inference (which when codified as a principle I referred to as the supervenience of descriptive adequacy) is facilitated by thinking of successful science in a particular way—as fitting into a hierarchically organized system of laws that culminates in simple and general laws of physics.  To understand something scientifically, according to this image, is to recognize it as a consequence of more fundamental (and preferably physical) principles.  As a result, discrepancies between the mere ‘proximate principles’ characterizing messy or complex real world situations and the supposed “ultimate and sufficient” higher principles taken to ‘govern’ the situation are evidence that the real world situation is not understood scientifically.  Additionally, from the fact that a phenomenon is not understood in the way characteristic of this image of science, it is then inferred that it is not possible to make quantitatively reliable predictions about the phenomenon (at least in complex cases like global climate modeling).

As I have suggested throughout this paper, I think that this way of thinking about the predictive potential of global climate modeling is misguided. Assessing the predictive potential of global climate modeling against a backdrop provided by a theologized image of physics involves making a substantial number of controversial, and I think implausible, epistemological assumptions.  First there is the idea that true scientific understanding involves tracing a phenomenon back to fundamental laws, and more specifically the fundamental laws of physics.  While this sort of fundamentalism is still attractive to many philosophers and scientists, work by contemporary philosophers of science has shown, I think, that fundamentalism is at best an ideal towards which some scientists strive, and not an accurate characterization of the bulk of successful science and/or applied science​[8]​. Second, even if one accepts that science should aspire to a hierarchically organized system of laws, it does not follow that accurate predictions or descriptions of complex, real world systems require accurate descriptions of the supposed more fundamental processes responsible for them.  Though it is evidently tempting to suppose that understanding in the rich, hierarchical sense that a fundamentalist champions is essential to prediction (in complex cases), whether this is so is ultimately a question that can and should be answered empirically. In order to provide a perspective on the predictive capabilities of global climate modeling that is not polluted by a theologized image of science and its consequent downplaying of the understanding and predictive power provided by mere “proximate principles”, I want to develop, in the rest of this paper, the thought that the use of global climate models to craft policies for addressing climate change should be thought of as engineering science.

Engineering science is the development of  “the understanding of nature and … predictive capabilities for engineering design purposes” (Anderson, 1998, p. 448).  Typically it is fields such as aeronautics or aerodynamics that are thought of as engineering sciences.  In these fields, engineers develop techniques that will allow them to design technological objects that serve certain purposes or meet specific requirements.  The design of a technological object—such as an airplane, for example—requires (among many other things) detailed and accurate predictions about how specific components of the design will contribute to the overall performance of the object.  In order to choose what sort of propellers to put on an airplane, for example, the airplane designer would appeal to the predicted performance characteristics of propellers of various shapes and sizes.  Since designers are working to create new technological objects, they cannot typically evaluate the contributions of individual components by “direct testing.” Instead they must make use of engineering theories of various sorts in order to project facts about how components work in certain known circumstances (scale models in wind tunnels, say) to predictions about how similar components would work in a novel design in a real world situation (a new plane in the atmosphere).  Because they are driven, ultimately, by practical considerations such as performance characteristics and design costs, engineers are typically quite pragmatic about what sort of engineering theories they use in the design process.  When fundamental physical theories allow them to make useful predictions at a reasonable cost, engineers are happy to use them.  However, when no such theories are available—as they are often not, because of the complex, real world character of many of the situations that engineers hope to make predictions about—they must go on making reliable predictions nonetheless​[9]​. This means that engineering science should provide fertile ground for evaluating epistemological principles that purport to characterize the circumstances in which quantitative predictions are reliable.  

There are several reasons why it makes sense to think of global climate modeling as a form of engineering science.  In the context of policy design, global climate models are used to supply information about the climatic consequences of various emission scenarios.   This means that they are playing a role very much like the engineering theories eluded to in the last paragraph.  The global climate models use measured information about past climate to project the impacts of various design specifications into novel circumstances.  While it would be desirable for global climate models to supply predictions that are accurate in all their details and based on fundamental physical principles, there is no requirement—imposed by the design project at hand— that this be the case.  It is enough that global climate models supply predictions that are quantitatively reliably enough that they allow for accurate assessments of various policy options.  Additionally, global climate modeling is—just like aerodynamics and aeronautics—engaged in trying to solve an applied fluid mechanics problem.  Aeronautical engineers try to predict how new materials, airfoil shapes, or nozzle designs will impact the fluid mechanics of real world objects moving through the air.  Global climate modelers try to predict how two coupled fluids (the ocean and the atmosphere) will respond to heat influxes of various sorts.  The same basic equations of fluid mechanics are the starting point for each discipline, and each must parameterize, simplify, and extrapolate in order to render those equations into a form in which they can be used to obtain useful design predictions.  Global climate modeling should not be thought of as a desperate and implausible attempt to derive the future condition of the atmosphere from the fundamental laws of physics.  When thought of in this way, it comes across as inadequate science in whose predictive adequacy we should have little confidence.  Instead, global climate modeling should be thought of as an attempt to use available climate data and physical theory in order to make quantitative predictions about future climate that are sufficiently reliable for policy design.  Thinking of global climate modeling in this way does not establish that it is predicatively reliable, but it does assimilate it to other cases of engineering science that are acknowledged by almost everyone, at least implicitly, to be predicatively reliable.

Our confidence in the predictive adequacy of engineering science is demonstrated whenever we make use of some product of engineering design, such as an airplane, a bridge, or a boiler. The design of all of these technological devices involved engineering theories of various sorts.  On the basis of these theories, coupled with limited empirical testing, we expect these devices to perform in reliable and safe ways, even in novel circumstances.  Sometimes we are wrong (e.g. the Chevy Corvair or the Challenger’s O-ring), but mostly our engineering theories serve us well by providing reliable guidance about how some design will behave in the real world.  If this is right, then it should be enough to disarm general epistemological skepticism about the quantitative predictive adequacy of global climate modeling. For, if it can be established that engineering science has many of the same epistemological characteristics cited by the skeptics as reasons not to trust the predictive adequacy of global climate modeling, then it would follow that they should not accept predictions to which their actions commit them.  That is, I will argue that by parity of reasoning, the global climate modeling skeptic is committed to rejecting the predictive adequacy of engineering science as well.   Since he or she obviously does trust the predictions of engineering science, this implies that the epistemological grounds for suspicion about the predictive adequacy of global climate modeling should be given up.
Engineering science is, of course, an extremely broad and diverse field.  Given its pragmatic orientation, it should be no surprise that it includes an epistemologically diverse set of techniques and theories.  For my purposes, it will suffice to describe two techniques used in aircraft design that undermine the fundamentalism and supervenience of descriptive adequacy that were found to be the core assumptions behind global climate modeling skepticism.  These techniques are not direct epistemological analogues of global climate modeling, and so the fact that they are used successfully in aeronautics does not directly support the conclusion that global climate modeling is predictively reliable.  Instead, the success of these techniques should be taken to establish that the general epistemological principles invoked by climate modeling skeptics are not accurate characterizations of the conditions in which it is possible to have predictively successful models or theories.  Thus, general skepticism about the reliability of the predictions of global climate models will be revealed as an expression of the skeptics own vision of what successful science is, or should, be like rather than a cogent criticism grounded in facts about what kinds of models and theories can reliably generate predictions.

Control volume analysis is a technique used throughout the engineering sciences in order to make predictions about fluid flows of various sorts.  Often, for design purposes, it is enough to have some very general knowledge about a fluid flow rather than a detailed point-by-point description of the relevant flow.  For instance, a designer might need to know the force exerted by a fluid as is moves through a bend in a pipe, but not the details of whatever turbulence is induced in the flow by the pipe joint.  It is a good thing that design can get by with this very general knowledge because it is often impossible to supply the details—the real world situations that the engineer is concerned with are typically too complex to treat using the ‘fundamental’ physical laws that describe fluid flow in simpler cases.  Vincenti (Vincenti, 1990, p. 116) describes the use of control volume analysis thus:

Engineers frequently must deal with flow problems so complex that the underlying physics is not completely understood or the differential equations that describe the phenomena point by point cannot be solved throughout the flow.  In such situations control-volume analysis, by working with information only on boundaries and ignoring the interior physics, can often supply limited but highly useful results of an overall nature.

Similarly, global climate modelers use their models to make predictions about very general features of the climate, such as the average global temperature.  It is not possible for them to generate such predictions by derivations from fundamental physical laws.  Instead, they make use of parameterizations that ignore the interior physics.  They can afford to neglect the mechanisms behind the physical process that they parameterize so long as these processes are inessential to making the general predictions needed for their design problem. Whether this is so, or not, is what climatologists assess in the process of model evaluation.  It is quite possible and frequently necessary—as control volume analysis in engineering science shows—to make adequate predictions, for the purposes of some design problem, about a physical system without accurately characterizing the more fundamental processes on which that system is based.

Another strategy used by engineers to get on with design problems when fundamental theory is not useful is the development of phenomenological theories and their refinement by parameter variation.  A phenomenological theory is a tool for making design predictions when “the phenomena in question are too poorly understood or too difficult to handle otherwise” (Vincenti, 1990, p. 215).  These theories may, or may not, originate from more fundamental physical theories, but typically involve some “ad hoc assumption about phenomena crucial to the problem” (Vincenti, 1990, p. 214).  Furthermore, it is frequently the case that these assumptions are known to be wrong and are “demonstrably faulty in some degree” (Vincenti, 1990, p. 215).  A phenomenological theory may work well for some design problem, but not supply accurate enough information in another design context.  In such cases, it is sometimes possible to refine these theories by experimental parameter variation.  The idea here is to experimentally explore the parameter space of the phenomenological theory in order to supply better numerical values for the parameters in the phenomenological model, or to suggest ways of modifying or correcting the phenomenological theory.  This is not just ‘trial and error’ because it makes use of the factors that are important to the design problem, as indicated in the phenomenological theory.  This general sort of strategy was made use of, for example, in the development and refinement of a theory of the design characteristics (power supplied, drag, etc) of airplane propellers (see Vincenti, 1990, Ch. 5).  Remarking on the general applicability of this approach in engineering science, Vincenti (Vincenti, 1990, pp. 162, 167) claims:

Experimental parameter variation is used in engineering … to produce the data needed to bypass the absence of a useful quantitative theory, that is, to get on with the engineering job when no accurate or convenient theoretical knowledge is possible … Most of our ability, for example, to design devices involving the ubiquitous but still scientifically intractable problems of turbulent fluid flow derives from this capacity.

Global climate modelers find themselves in much the same situation as the engineers that Vincenti describes.  They are trying to develop a model with a large phenomenological component in order to supply certain design information.  In order to do this, they have isolated a set of factors that, they hope, are sufficient to account for the predictions they want to generate. Sometimes they must sacrifice micro-realism in order for their phenomenological theory to fit the known data well.  Sometimes they must use the available experimental data in order fix numerical values for their parameters.  Furthermore, their models may work well in some contexts—like in predicting global average temperature—and not so well in others—like in reproducing El Niño.  None of these features, though, distinguishes global climate modelers from those engineers who supply the numerical predictions that are counted on every day by those of us who make use of technological devices of various sorts.
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^1	  According to the IPCC (Hegerl, et. al. 2007, pp. 667-8), Detection is “the process of demonstrating that climate has changed in some defined statistical sense, without providing a reason for that change,” while attribution is “the process of establishing the most likely causes for the detected change.”
^2	  I am pleased to report that this situation seems to be changing.  In addition to the forceful, but perhaps overstated, defense of climate modeling in (Norton and Suppe, 2001), there is a substantial amount of new work on the epistemology of climate science that no longer strikes a skeptical tone. See (Winsberg, 2003), (Parker, 2006), and (Lenhard, 2007) for examples.
^3	  Interestingly, (Soon et. al., 2001) support their conclusion that GCMs have a merely heuristic value by citing (Oreskes et. al. 1994).  This is an unfortunate example of how climate contrarians have been able to co-opt the work of epistemologists that have expressed doubts about the predictive adequacy of climate models.
^4	  A common strategy of global climate model skeptics is to present their ‘external’ criticisms as if they were ‘internal’ criticisms.  That is, they cite data generated by particular models and then argue, by invoking some ‘external’ epistemological norms, that global climate models have not yet established their epistemological credentials.  This allows them to use the rhetoric of constructive criticism by presenting themselves as helping climate science to move towards epistemic respectability.  This is bullshit, of course, and can be recognize by the appeal to ‘obvious’ epistemological norms not accepted within the global climate modeling community.  A classic example occurs in (Soon et. al., 2001) where they first invoke the “rules of science” and then Popperian falsificationism and conclude: “Progress [in the interpretation of GCMs] will be made only by formulating and testing a falsifiable hypothesis.  The criticisms in this review are presented with the aim of improving climate model physics and the use of GCMs for climate science research” (Soon et. al, 2001, p. 272).
^5	  (Soon et. al., 2001, p. 260) claim: “[I]n order for such a calculation [of anthropogenic climatic impacts] to have predictive value, rather than merely to represent the sensitivity of a particular model, a model must be validated specifically for the purpose of its type of prediction … A logistically feasible validation for such predictions is essentially inconceivable.” This is completely in line with the argument as it appears in Oreskes and Haller, but not quite as explicit, so I will not treat it separately.
^6	  In fact, as (Lenhard, 2007, p. 184-6) points out, the very dynamical core of modern global circulation models uses the Arakawa operator in order to maintain stable time evolved simulations of the atmosphere.  The Arakawa operator “assume[s] the conservation of kinetic energy in the atmosphere, although it was well known that this energy … is definitely not conserved.”  
^7	  (Shackley et. al. 1999) contains a description of how flux adjustments are used in climate change modeling, a characterization of how they differ from more standard tuning, as well as a survey of the attitudes of climate scientists to the use of flux adjustments.
^8	  See Cartwright (1996) for more on the assumptions behind, and the plausibility of fundamentalism.  See (Goodwin, 2007) for an example of a successful science in which the development of a scientific understanding of a range of phenomena does not involve subsuming those phenomena under laws at all, much less under fundamental laws of physics.
^9	  My conception of engineering science is drawn principally from (Vincenti, 1990) particularly Chapters 1 and 7.
